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“DECIDED PREPONDERANCE AT SEA”
Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought
Commander Kevin Rowlands, Royal Navy
Oliver Cromwell famously declared that “a man-o’-war is the best ambas-sador”; a twenty-first-century equivalent represents the U.S. Navy in 
posters and on T-shirts and sweatshirts as an aircraft carrier over the caption 
“90,000 tons of diplomacy.” Though the images may be different, the message 
is the same—yet “naval diplomacy” is not a readily understood term. From the 
coercion delivered by the gunboats of the Pax Britannica to the modern-day ex-
ercise of soft power through hardware, interpretations of what constitutes naval 
diplomacy are wide-ranging. Strategists have undoubtedly long been aware of its 
existence, but over the centuries few have been moved to study or document it 
in any substantial way. 
The purpose of this article is to establish what has been written about this 
important dimension of international politics so that it can be better understood 
and better implemented, or countered, in future. The 
political (or diplomatic) role of sea power has always 
been important and, arguably, far more commonly 
exercised than its wartime uses. Indeed, it is unique 
to navies and has no parallel on land or in the air. But 
examination of naval strategy exposes a knowledge 
gap: the major works of Mahan, Corbett, and others 
are filled with the preparation for, and the conduct of, 
war at sea, but most offer little more than an oblique 
reference to what navies have historically done on a 
day-to-day, year-by-year basis. 
Mahan in his classic work talks of naval “prestige” 
and “flying the flag,” but in passing. Corbett similarly 
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acknowledges peacetime employment but does not concentrate on it. Indeed, 
it was not until the second half of the twentieth century—the era of the Cold 
War—that naval diplomacy started to be studied in its own right, but that study 
was, of course, tempered by the geopolitical situation of the time. Cable, Booth, 
and Luttwak in the West and Gorshkov in the East placed naval diplomacy in the 
realm of their own understandings. But was their era, that of the Cold War, really 
representative of a long historical development in naval thought, or could it have 
been a historical “blip”?
Today, the combined fleets of the West effectively exercise command of the 
oceans, with few regional powers capable of contesting the seas even locally. 
These fleets’ position of strength has arguably led to a subtle shift in their role 
along the spectrum of conflict from major combat operations back to constabu-
lary and diplomatic tasks.1 Though no direct peer competitors yet exist, rising 
powers, particularly in the East, are developing credible maritime strategies not 
wholly based on war fighting. Whether these powers are seeking to join the ex-
isting international system or to challenge it remains to be seen. The Cold War 
ended over twenty years ago, and it has taken time for a new global order to 
become clear, and it might not be clear yet. For navies this shift in emphasis and 
increasing focus on “influence” may not be a new phenomenon. 
This article takes “naval diplomacy” to mean the exertion of influence on 
international affairs through naval power when not at war. It attempts to trace 
the historiography of naval diplomacy through strategic thought and determine 
whether there has been a return to the use of navies as peacetime policy instru-
ments of the state and tools of grand strategy, or whether it is merely business as 
usual in the twenty-first century. 
MAHAN, CORBETT, AND CLASSICAL NAVAL DIPLOMACY 
The classic naval texts are essentially Atlanticist in nature, reflecting the concen-
tration of maritime power, first in Europe and then in North America. Nonethe-
less, they offer some generic principles that are applicable globally. Perhaps the 
most influential naval writer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, focused his thesis in The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History on navies at war, particularly the navies of 
England, France, and the United Provinces in the age of sail, and he did not spe-
cifically mention naval diplomacy. However, peppered throughout his work are 
examples and comments on the utility of threat and limited force by navies. In 
particular, Mahan acknowledges the importance of navies in peacetime, observ-
ing that the requirement for naval strategy differs from that for a land-centric 
military strategy in that the former is as necessary in peace as in war.2 
Examination of Mahan’s work for reference to what amounts to naval diplomacy
—even if the term is not used—reveals two broad themes. In the contemporary 
NWC_Autumn2012Review.indd   90 8/14/12   8:46 AM
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 4, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss4/9
 ROW L A N D S  91
language of “hard” and “soft” power, Mahan could arguably be said to view navies 
both as instruments of coercion and as agents of national reputation. In the early 
sections of his major work Mahan writes of ancient Rome during the Carthagin-
ian wars, discussing how the Roman fleet was positioned to “check” Macedonia, 
an ally of Hannibal, and was so successful in doing so that “not a soldier of the 
phalanx ever set foot in Italy.”3 The principle employed by this threatening naval 
force was one of prevention and deterrence. Similarly, coercion through overt 
presence and shows of greatness was applied when “Roman fleets . . . visited the 
coasts of Africa.”4 Great-power deterrence, manifest in Mahan’s history, can be 
considered a significant form of naval diplomacy. Even in antiquity Thucydides, 
author of that great foundation of strategic studies The Peloponnesian War, attri-
butes the growth of Athenian power to its fleet and its limited sorties throughout 
the Aegean: “The navies [of] . . . the period,” he wrote in the first chapter of the 
first book, were “the greatest power to those who cultivated them.”5
Mahan, in a later work, a collection of articles published at the turn of the 
twentieth century, applied his own thesis to contemporary events. The Boxer 
Rebellion of 1898–1901 against Western imperialism in China, for example, 
threatened free trade and risked “the interest of the commercial nations and of 
maritime powers.”6 Without resorting to total war, the West used limited military 
force extensively. An eight-nation alliance mounted naval intervention, policing, 
and stabilization expeditions along the coast of China and inland up the major 
river systems, particularly the Yangtze, to quash the uprising.7 Two forms of naval 
diplomacy can be seen at play in turn-of-the-century China: the show of limited 
force by the strong to the weak and the building of coalitions. In another series 
of essays Mahan expands on coalition building, discussing the “possibilities of an 
Anglo-American reunion” and seeing the opportunities for cooperative progress 
in the common ground of sea power.8 
That some states were ready and able to mount sea actions while others were 
not is worthy of mention. Mahan identified character, both of a nation and of a 
government, as an essential element of sea power. The willingness to be “bold” 
and of an “adventurous nature,” he asserted, is key. For the age of sail, in which 
he concentrated his analysis, he compared the characters of England and Hol-
land, the outwardly focused nations of “shopkeepers,” with that of France, with 
its trait of “prudence,” concluding that the former were more likely to exercise sea 
power.9 Today this characteristic could be expressed in policy terms as a willing-
ness to be expeditionary; Mahan closely associates this active pursuit of national 
interest with image, flying the flag, and “prestige.” Aggressively won “honor” and 
“prestige” at sea were not to be ignored; skirmishes on land would more often 
lead to war than would the flexing of muscles at sea, where, out of sight and 
unconstrained by geography, they could be used as timely reminders of power. 
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Mahan’s “prestige” factor is perhaps comparable to the power of “attraction” 
in the more recent words of Joseph Nye, the leading thinker on soft and “smart” 
power in contemporary international politics.10 According to Nye military force 
can produce “behavioral outcomes” even when not used in war: “Success attracts, 
and a reputation for competence in the use of force helps to attract.”11 Prestige 
and attraction are both about image and perception, not truth. Mahan again: 
“The decline of prestige may involve as much illusion as its growth; therefore its 
value, while not to be denied, may be easily exaggerated. Prestige then does not 
necessarily correspond with fact.”12
For Mahan, if naval “prestige” were to be perceived to be of political utility to 
government it needed to be not only widely recognized but also carefully target-
ed, by timely geographical presence. Though his thesis is laid out in the context 
of the colonial powers of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, there are 
unambiguous parallels to other ages, including our own. Naval diplomacy, a form 
of wider political effort, is a means of communication in power relationships. 
Mahan’s point was that national security in peacetime can be aided by a “decided 
preponderance at sea.”13 The influence of Mahan upon history cannot be over-
stated; it has been vociferously argued that his theories swayed the United States, 
Japan, and Germany, among others, in the early years of the twentieth century.14
Writing shortly after Mahan on the other side of the Atlantic, Sir Julian Cor-
bett expanded further on the theories of naval warfare in his book Some Principles 
of Maritime Strategy. Like Mahan, Corbett did not specifically ally his principles 
to operations other than war; indeed, his work has been described as “weak” on 
law and order at sea in peacetime.15 Instead he preferred to develop his ideas as 
“the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor.”16 
However, he did discuss “limited” war at some length;17 it could be argued that 
his theories on blockade, both naval and commercial, and on the strategy of a 
“fleet in being” could be applied at different points on the spectrum of conflict 
and thus be effectively used as tools of coercive naval diplomacy.
One manifestation of coercion that Corbett examined was the “demonstra-
tion.” He considered, for example, the success of a British fleet under Rear Admiral 
John Purvis cruising off Cádiz in 1808. Purvis’s force, by presence, negotiation, 
and demonstrable capability, “encouraged” Spanish revolt against the French in a 
way that would not have been available to committed land forces.18 Demonstra-
tion, in the modern sense, is about leverage, and Corbett uses Napoleon’s words 
to underline its effectiveness:19 “With 30,000 men in transports at the Downs [a 
relatively shallow area of the North Sea off the southeast coast of England] the 
English can paralyse 300,000 of my army and that will reduce us to the rank of a 
second-class power.”20
The transports, of course, are naval.
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A near contemporary and “disciple” of Corbett was the British admiral and 
theorist Sir Herbert Richmond.21 “Sea power, in its full expression,” he wrote, “is 
a form of national strength capable of giving weight to national policy.”22 As for 
his antecedents, Richmond’s focus on war dominates his work, but his thoughts 
on the peacetime utility of naval force can be found in his pages. He attributes the 
expansion of the British Empire to naval power and sees it as a means to national 
greatness and, ultimately, peace: “All the greater naval nations assure the world 
that a great navy is the surest guarantee of peace; that it gives security against 
war, and is therefore a highly beneficial institution.”23 Richmond also alerts his 
readers to (albeit under different terms) other, nonmilitary, naval roles, such as 
humanitarian relief, noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement, which fit 
the broad continuum of naval diplomacy.24 
It is evident that the writers of the classic naval texts understood the utility of 
naval forces in nonwar scenarios. Terminology may have changed, but “flying the 
flag” and “prestige” can be equated with influence and the exercise of soft power, 
while “gunboat diplomacy” and “demonstration” are effectively the forerunners 
of coercion and coercive diplomacy. Writing at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centuries, neither Mahan nor Corbett could possibly 
have placed his work in the context of the world a hundred years hence. As far 
as they were concerned, however, they were recording for posterity the enduring 
principles of maritime strategy—and in fact, with the benefit of hindsight, later 
historians added a different perspective that shows the views of the classic naval 
strategists to have generally stood the test of time. 
Multipolarity in global affairs, the world order in Mahan’s and Corbett’s time, 
was often not as anarchic as might at first be assumed; it was generally accompa-
nied by the presence of one dominant power. From the eighteenth century until 
at least the early twentieth, that dominant power was Great Britain, and the Royal 
Navy enjoyed command of the sea. Robert Keohane has coined the term “hege-
monic stability” to describe the situation in which a wider peace is the result of 
the diplomacy, coercion, and persuasion of the leading power.25 This period of 
Britain’s dominance was commonly referred to as the “Pax Britannica.”
Jeremy Black acknowledges the role the naval forces of the hegemonic power 
could play in maintaining the world order: “Throughout much of the nineteenth 
century, foreign expectations and fears about British power allowed Britain to get 
grudging unofficial recognition of the Pax Britannica, the doctrine of the Royal 
Navy keeping the peace of the sea for all to benefit.”26 The Royal Navy acted as a 
policy instrument of the state through military endeavor and constabulary ac-
tion, playing, for instance, a decisive role in supporting the government’s politi-
cal objective of the abolition of the slave trade.27 Some writers have labeled the 
British use of sea power during the Pax Britannica as “altruistic,” but this rather 
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misses the point.28 Britain maintained its leading position in the world through 
economic strength supported by military, predominantly naval, might. British 
sea power was used during the period very much in the national interest and thus 
as an instrument of state power, but the stability it provided was tacitly welcomed 
by other states as well; it was all the more effective for the Royal Navy’s rarely hav-
ing to resort to high-intensity warfare.
However, Britain’s supremacy did not go unchallenged. The pre–First World 
War naval arms race with Germany, with both sides resorting to using their fleets 
for geopolitical gain, is well documented. In Germany, Alfred von Tirpitz’s vision, 
as State Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office, of maritime ascendancy inspired 
the national leadership;29 Kaiser Wilhelm II gave an “imperial performance” to 
mark Germany’s intent to be a world power while at Tangier during a Mediterra-
nean cruise in 1905.30 In the United Kingdom the “Navy Scare” of 1909 (sparked 
by news of the acceleration of the German naval building program) was used to 
justify huge increases in the numbers of the Royal Navy’s dreadnoughts.31 Simi-
larly, at the beginning of the twentieth century the United States sought to claim 
its place as a first-rank power largely through the expansion of its own navy. 
Henry Hendrix has documented the rise of the aspiring power in his Theodore 
Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy, which uses a series of case studies to demonstrate 
the utility of the naval forces available to the government. Many of the instances 
were coercive in nature, such as the defense of the Panamanian revolution in 
1903 when the province was attempting to gain independence from Colombia, 
and the heavy-handed deployment of a squadron to Tangier after the kidnapping 
of an American citizen in Morocco in 1904.32 The crowning glory of the U.S. 
Navy at the time and the soft-power counterbalance to its coercive diplomacy 
was in sailing the “Great White Fleet” on a round-the-world influence mission, 
1907–1909.33 
CABLE, GORSHKOV, AND NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN A BIPOLAR 
WORLD
Naval diplomacy continued through the two world wars of the twentieth century, 
but the political climate of the Cold War perhaps placed more stringent limits on 
the use of force, certainly between the major blocs, as the strategic focus turned 
to nuclear deterrence. Though greater utility was attached to the diplomatic role 
of the military instrument, little academic attention was directed that way; one 
exception was the work of Sir James Cable. Cable was instrumental in moving 
the understanding of naval diplomacy forward, but he was essentially a Cold 
War writer. Though the period of his analysis, presented in three editions of his 
seminal work Gunboat Diplomacy, ran from the end of the First World War to the 
early 1990s, it was inevitably viewed through a prism of state-to-state relations. 
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Coercive by definition, his gunboat diplomacy was always “done” by one side to 
another. It is telling that Cable narrowly defined “gunboat diplomacy” as “the 
use or threat of use of limited naval force, otherwise than an act of war, in order 
to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international 
dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of 
their own state” and that he chronicled each of the incidents through the seven 
decades of his study in terms of an “assailant” and a “victim.”34 But the reality 
can be more complex, with a multitude of stakeholders, be they domestic audi-
ences or the international community, directly or indirectly involved in every 
“incident.” Binary it is not.
The robust language used by Cable, a professional diplomat, is an enduring 
characteristic of his work. He believed that coercion was implicit in most aspects 
of international relations and that if a government is willing to “reward friends 
and to punish enemies its wishes will at least receive careful consideration.”35 
This realist perspective reflects the dominant thinking of the latter half of the 
Cold War:36 “To be coercive a threat must be more than a generalised prediction 
of disastrous consequences, however plausible, in the immediate future. It must 
express readiness to do something injurious to the interest of another govern-
ment unless that government either takes, or desists from or refrains from some 
indicated course of action.”37
The realist approach also provides a framework within which his model ex-
plains coercion at sea. To Cable, gunboat diplomacy could be categorized among 
four modes, which he discusses in descending order of effectiveness. Definitive 
force he explains as an act or threat of force possessed of an authoritative purpose 
apparent to both sides. The intent of the employing force must be recognized as 
limited and must be considered tolerable by the recipient, the “victim”—that is, 
more desirable than resort to war:38 
A government embarking on an act of genuinely limited force should thus have a 
reasonable expectation that force initially employed will be sufficient to achieve the 
specific purpose originally envisaged without regard to the reactions of the victim, 
whose options are thus confined to acquiescence, ineffectual resistance or a retalia-
tion that can only follow, and not prevent, the achievement of the desired result. In 
such cases, the use of force is not merely limited but is also definitive: it creates a fait 
accompli.39
Purposeful force, according to Cable, is less direct and less reliable than defini-
tive force.40 He explains it as limited naval force applied in order to change the 
policy or character of a foreign government. In itself, he wrote, the force does 
not do anything; it acts to induce the recipient to take a decision that would not 
otherwise have been taken.41 
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Catalytic force was described by Cable as a case in which limited naval force 
“lends a hand” so as to catalyze a situation the direction of which has yet to reveal 
itself.42 In essence, he explains it as an act undertaken when there is an underlying 
feeling that “something is going to happen.”43 Less effective than either defini-
tive or purposeful force, it is more likely, he claimed, to result in failure. Cable is 
rather ambiguous about the use of catalytic force and labels as such few of the 
incidents listed in his chronological appendix. One of those few is the bombard-
ment of targets in Beirut by the battleship USS New Jersey in 1983, when peace-
keeping forces were under threat ashore, though this and other cases could be just 
as easily be placed in another of Cable’s categories.44
The final mode of gunboat diplomacy is that in which warships are employed 
to emphasize attitudes or to make a point—expressive force, which Cable readily 
dismisses as “the last and least of the uses of limited naval force,” promising only 
vague and uncertain results.45 Cable explains how the “purposeful” can descend 
into the “expressive” for reasons of domestic political necessity.46 His justification 
for including expressive force as a category was simply that it was commonly em-
ployed, affording governments vehicles for visual manifestation of their positions 
with little political commitment. Effectively, however, his justification underlines 
the particular advantages of naval forces as communicative tools and runs coun-
ter to his own low opinion of their worth in that capacity. 
The first edition of Gunboat Diplomacy, published in 1971, received praise 
that was still alive thirty-five years later. Richard Hill, for instance, opined in 2006 
that Cable’s work “sharpened to a point the theory and experience of ‘effective-
ness short of war’ and reminded navies of what they had been doing rather than 
what they had been training for.”47 Subsequently, the 1970s saw if not a torrent, 
at least a stream of other works building the understanding of naval diplomacy 
in the West, the most notable of which were by Edward Luttwak and Ken Booth.
Luttwak, an American strategist, published The Political Uses of Sea Power in 
1974. The book, though short, ranges widely and debates the use of armed forces 
in general before settling on naval power. Rather than be constrained by concepts 
such as coercion and deterrence, Luttwak adopts the term “suasion” to frame his 
arguments. Suasion, he writes, is a “conveniently neutral term . . . whose meaning 
suggests the indirectness of any political application of naval force.”48 Under the 
umbrella of naval suasion Luttwak placed a spectrum of operations, from routine 
deployment to “deliberate action.” At what might be called the “softer” end, where 
he situates routine deployments, navies can deliver local deterrent or supportive 
functions. Luttwak labels this end of the spectrum “latent suasion,” and it cor-
relates well with Cable’s expressive force; some later commentators subsumed it 
into wider defense diplomacy. Deliberate action, the “active” side of Luttwak’s 
spectrum, corresponding to definitive or purposeful force in Cable’s terminology, 
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was further broken down into the positive and negative of coercive elements— 
respectively, compellence and deterrence.49
Luttwak’s work was very much a product of the Cold War and was obviously 
influenced by Cable and the theorist Thomas Schelling (both are acknowledged), 
but it is perhaps less politically impartial than that of the earlier writers. Luttwak 
discussed differences in perceptions of military strength between the Western 
and Eastern blocs as U.S. “self-denigration”;50 he criticized “declining” American 
influence in the Middle East;51 and he identified increasing multipolarity during 
the 1970s détente—a conclusion that seems prescient if somewhat premature 
when read nearly four decades later.52 
Edward Luttwak certainly added to the debate on naval diplomacy in the 
1970s. However, he did not enjoy the same success among practitioners as did 
other commentators, like Cable, whose work fed directly into the maritime doc-
trines of most Western navies, perhaps because the basis of Luttwak’s theory of 
“suasion” was in practice its main limitation. Luttwak robustly emphasized the 
importance of image and perception over capability, dedicating a whole chapter 
to “visibility and viability” and arguing, for instance, that “to frighten South Ye-
men or encourage the Sheik of Abu Dhabi one does not need a powerful sonar 
under the hull or a digital data system in the superstructure.”53 The proposition 
had merit but did not necessarily fit into the political or military narrative of the 
time. Critics have dismissed with relative ease such assertions as simplistic, point-
ing to a range of examples of perceived weaker navies who have succeeded over 
stronger maritime powers. A case in point was the success of the Icelandic Coast 
Guard against Britain during the “Cod Wars.”54 
Ken Booth’s Navies and Foreign Policy, published in 1977, drew on Luttwak’s 
ideas, which he acknowledged as “useful,” but went farther.55 The work is signifi-
cant in that it introduced the “trinity of naval functions,” a phrase that has since 
been incorporated into the formal doctrine of the British, American, Canadian, 
and Australian navies, among others.56 The concept suggests that naval forces 
have three main roles: military, policing, and diplomatic. Within the diplomatic 
role, which Booth defines as “concerned with the management of foreign policy 
short of actual employment of force,” a state’s political objectives are realized 
through subsidiary means: negotiation through strength, manipulation, and 
prestige.57 The latter, he concedes, is “invariably a by-product” of the others.58 
Booth approached the utility of navies from a functional perspective and 
identified seven key characteristics of warships as diplomatic instruments: ver-
satility, controllability, mobility, projection ability, access potential, symbolism, 
and endurance.59 Taking the characteristics and applying them to operations, 
he posited five basic tenets of naval diplomacy, which he subdivided into two 
groups. The first group, which he termed “naval power politics,” encompassed 
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standing demonstrations of naval power and specific operational deployments. 
The second group, “naval influence politics,” consisted of naval aid, operational 
visits, and specific goodwill visits.60 It is worthy of note that Booth’s understand-
ing of naval diplomacy, contrary to Cable’s, gravitates to the less coercive end of 
the spectrum. If fitted to Luttwak’s model it tends toward latent suasion. 
As Western thinkers debated naval diplomacy, discussing themes from coer-
cion to cooperation, Eastern bloc opinions were also forming. Admiral of the 
Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey Gorshkov, the “architect” of the Cold War fleet 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), personally guided the develop-
ment of the navy for nearly thirty years, capturing in the late 1970s his thoughts 
in his major work, The Sea Power of the State.61 
His theory was born out of study as well as observation and experience. 
Gorshkov was a student of naval history, certainly patriotic, and a keen watcher 
of the West.62 In his discussion of the development of the Soviet fleet he was un-
ambiguously nationalistic and defensive; indeed, the opening chapter of his book 
is an out-and-out attack on imperialism and capitalism. However, it is striking 
how Gorshkov used examples of the West’s successful diplomatic use of navies 
to convince the leaders of the land-focused USSR of the utility of sea power. 
Gorshkov implied that Soviet naval growth after 1945 had been in direct response 
to American naval advances and not simply designed for the furtherance of So-
viet foreign policy.63 Nonetheless, he used his knowledge of Western maritime 
strategy to introduce a forward-presence mission to a fleet that had traditionally 
concentrated on coastal defensive tactics. He intuitively understood that the navy 
could be extremely useful in operations other than war: “Demonstrative actions 
by the navy in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without 
resorting to armed struggle. . . . The navy has always been an instrument of the 
policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.”64 Also, mirroring 
other naval thinkers, he associated maritime strength with national prestige: 
“The strength of the fleets was one of the factors helping states to move into the 
category of great powers. Moreover, history shows that states not possessing naval 
forces were unable for a long time to occupy the position of a great power.”65
What is clear is that Gorshkov’s work was written primarily for a domestic au-
dience and that he was very aware of the benefits of military strength in nonwar 
scenarios. However, what is also apparent is that his vision was largely reactive 
and followed developments in the West. He saw NATO as “an alliance of maritime 
states, with powerful naval forces occupying advantageous strategic positions in 
the World Ocean.”66 He used strong rhetoric to illustrate the threat he perceived: 
“For over a century, American imperialism used the navy as the main instrument 
of its aggressive foreign policy in line with prevailing tradition and was impressed 
by the concept of sea power which was presented as an irreplaceable means of 
achieving world dominance.”67
 98  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
NWC_Autumn2012Review.indd   98 8/14/12   8:46 AM
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 4, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss4/9
 ROW L A N D S  99
The true intention of Western sea power in peacetime, he wrote, was “gun 
diplomacy.”68 This assertion was, of course, not necessarily an ill-informed in-
sult. The importance of sea power in “achieving world dominance” was already a 
generally accepted concept. Gorshkov used the term “local wars of imperialism” 
to encapsulate his interpretations of Western strategy and offered the view that 
naval forces were the most suitable instruments for that strategy because of their 
mobility, persistence, independence, and ability to be deployed or withdrawn at 
will.69 Though Gorshkov used the attributes in his analysis of NATO strategy, they 
are recognizable, even universal, and equally applicable to his own forces of the 
time. “Local wars of imperialism” was a politically charged term, but the sense is 
familiar—it can be equated to that of the “limited wars” or “limited use of naval 
power” of Cable’s Gunboat Diplomacy.
However, unlike Cable’s, Gorshkov’s notion of naval diplomacy was not en-
tirely adversary centered. He was not unaware of its coercive potential, but he saw 
one role of sea power as that of “holding in check” allies to manage or maintain 
power relationships.70 He was particularly intrigued by the United Kingdom–
United States relationship and thought it “interesting” that the United States had 
achieved its position of relative maritime preeminence through close partnership 
with Britain, a position that Germany had failed to reach through confronta-
tion.71 Mahan would have been pleased.
Emphasizing the soft-power potential of naval diplomacy, Gorshkov built up 
a fleet that not only was a credible fighting force but deployed to nontraditional 
operating areas with a forthright agenda to extend communist influence:
The Soviet navy is also used in foreign policy measures by our state. But the aims of 
this use radically differ from those of the imperialist powers. The Soviet navy is an 
instrument for a peace-loving policy and friendship of the peoples, for a policy of 
cutting short the aggressive endeavors of imperialism, restraining military adventur-
ism and decisively countering threats to the safety of the peoples from the imperialist 
powers. . . . Soviet naval seamen . . . feel themselves ambassadors for our country. . . . 
Friendly visits by Soviet seamen offer the opportunity to the peoples of the countries 
visited to see for themselves the creativity of socialist principles in our country, the 
genuine parity of the peoples of the Soviet Union and their high cultural level. In our 
ships they see the achievements of Soviet science, technology and industry.72 
Though the language of the blocs was very different, the understanding and 
tactics of naval diplomacy during the Cold War were broadly similar in East and 
West. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of examples of the use of naval diplo-
macy during the period. Analysis was scant—the writers of the time were busy 
writing about deterrence and the means to prevent the Cold War becoming “hot.” 
Nonetheless, from coercion to reassurance to cooperation, the superpower navies 
were seen to have utility as instruments of state power beyond their primary war-
fighting role. 
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NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE POST–COLD WAR WORLD
The period since 1990 has been one of transformation and uncertainty in geo-
politics. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the USSR were argu-
ably the principal catalysts for change, but there were other milestones, in social, 
political, economic, and cultural spheres. The inexorable rise of China and India, 
the financial crises in the West, the normalization of liberal intervention and 
subsequent backlash of nationalist movements, insurgency, and anti-Western 
terrorism have all played their part, as has the ever-ramifying web of commercial 
interactions, linkages, and interdependencies known as globalization.73
In a “postmodern” era that has been characterized variously as the “end of 
history” and the “clash of civilizations” there has been no shortage of comment 
and conjecture;74 indeed, it could be argued that grand-strategic reevaluation is 
the norm following each great transformation of global politics. The First World 
War, for instance, marked a shift from balance-of-power politics to the pursuit of 
collective security through international systems for peace, such as the League of 
Nations.75 Similarly, at the end of the Second World War Sir William Beveridge 
discussed the place of armed force, in his The Price of Peace. Three general princi-
ples, he argued, should govern force: it must never be used for national purposes, 
the rights of each nation must not depend on whether it is armed or the scale of 
its armaments, and yet there must be sufficient arms in the world to enforce the 
rule of law and keep wrongdoers in order.76 Such words may seem naïve today, 
and they certainly did not predict the reality of the coming Cold War, but the 
context of the time in which they were written was marked by a very different 
perception, one based on optimistic expectation and shaped by what had gone 
before. In the same way, the plethora of immediate post–Cold War writing may 
not appear quite so insightful in the decades to come. 
If Cold War naval diplomacy was understood by practitioners and commenta-
tors as a means to maintain bipolar balance through coercion, reassurance, and 
image management, its post–Cold War expression was not quite so definitive. 
The new era was a period of change, and for a time in the 1990s one of the major 
blocs, the former Soviet Union—that is, its remnant the Russian Federation—all 
but ceased naval activity on grounds of affordability, while the other sailed the 
world’s oceans unopposed.77 The change in global politics inevitably took time 
to unpick, and as the remaining established navies continued to conduct “busi-
ness as usual” their professional leaderships and academia debated their collec-
tive place in the new world order.78 In a reinvestigation of coercive diplomacy, 
Peter Viggo Jakobson concluded that in general terms the theory stood but that 
it needed refinement, particularly in acknowledging the use of “carrots” as well 
as “sticks.”79 Some commentators were quick to go farther. Michael Pugh, for 
instance, stated that “navies are no longer accurate measures of national power” 
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and that “power, even symbolically, can no longer be solely equated with the bar-
rel of a gunboat.”80 
The U.S. Naval War College has published a series of monographs looking 
specifically at American naval strategy through the transitional periods of the 
1970s, ’80s, and ’90s.81 The latter decade stands out because of the scale and pace 
of development in strategic thought.82 Throughout, naval diplomacy was an ac-
knowledged feature of American strategy and was much discussed, though often 
under the banner of “forward presence”:
Forward-deployed naval forces help preserve U.S. influence overseas, even in places 
where we have no bases or political access. They enhance our ability to deter aggres-
sion, promote regional stability, strengthen diplomatic relations abroad and respond 
quickly to crisis. Naval forces provide policy makers with unique flexibility. We can 
quickly reposition a powerful fighting force off the coast of a country, out of sight to 
influence subtly or within sight to make a strong statement.83
Forward presence, Robert Wood, then dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval 
War College, stated in 1993, “is something we need to define in terms of meaning 
and degree as well as in terms of other names used for it throughout history.”84 
Similar reassessments also took place elsewhere. In the United Kingdom, the 
Royal Navy in the 1990s formally published its doctrine for the first time, with an 
acknowledgment of naval diplomacy. Eric Grove, discussing his part in writing 
the first edition of British Maritime Doctrine, stated, “We were not completely sat-
isfied with Sir James Cable’s taxonomy of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ for the purposes 
of doctrine and instead adopted ‘presence,’ ‘symbolic use,’ ‘coercion,’ and ‘preven-
tive, precautionary and pre-emptive naval diplomacy.’”85 Indeed, language is key; 
Canada similarly attempted to distance its doctrine from “gunboat” diplomacy, 
which it called a “pejorative” term, preferring instead “preventive deployments, 
coercion, presence and symbolic use.”86
The argument for naval diplomacy and forward presence appeared compelling 
with respect to the age of intervention but its value was limited by its focus on the 
naval forces of the West. Like other aspects of international-relations thought, it 
suffered from Western-centricity.87 In the early days of the aftermath of the Cold 
War virtually no attention was given to the navies of the rising powers—a short-
fall that has since been addressed.
In 2007 the Indian navy deployed a squadron of warships to Singapore, Yoko-
suka, Qingdao, Vladivostok, Manila, and Ho Chi Minh City. The deployment—a 
departure from previous Indian operating norms—bore, as the naval theorist 
Geoffrey Till remarked, “more than a passing resemblance to the famous cruise 
of Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet before the First World War.” The 
cruise delivered little in terms of specific exercises but was conducted “for general 
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purposes of greatness.” Specifically, there is undoubted rivalry between India 
and China in the region, and the deployment was the clear staking of a claim of 
regional dominance by the Indians.88 
Whether the Indian deployment was in reality different from the naval activity 
of the superpowers during the Cold War, representing a return to an older modus 
operandi, is uncertain. What is evident, however, is that naval diplomacy was 
alive and well at the turn of the twenty-first century, and not just by the global 
hegemon. Malcolm Murfett, one of a new generation of commentators beginning 
to question the significance of naval diplomacy, comes to the same conclusion: 
“One of the reasons why it still has relevance in the modern world is because it 
can be used on a wide variety of occasions to achieve certain tangible results.”89
China achieved such a “tangible result” when in 2008 it announced the dis-
patching of two destroyers and a support ship to the Gulf of Aden for counterpira-
cy operations. The deployment, though small by Western standards, demonstrated 
the ability of China’s navy to operate credibly and sustain a force at a distance and 
for a period that had previously been assumed to be beyond its capability. The 
People’s Liberation Army Navy “compelled Western observers to revise their once-
mocking estimate of Chinese aptitude for naval expeditionary operations.”90 Once 
again we hear mention of the outward character of a rising power. When Western 
analysts, notably in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War 
College, turned their attention to the East they found there had been in China a 
surge of interest in maritime affairs and in the theories of Mahan—interest that, 
viewed in concert with Indian and other Asian maritime expansion programs, 
pointed to a prospect of a “reconfiguration of maritime power” in the region and, 
by extension, globally.91 
{LINE-SPACE}
The literature shows that naval diplomacy has been used since man first put to 
sea in ships and that its history can be traced down through the years ever since. 
However, until the middle of the twentieth century, strategic naval writing tended 
to focus on military capability at sea, even though the political benefits of the 
threat of force, the use of limited force, and “showing the flag” were well known 
and implicitly understood. Naval diplomacy before the Second World War was 
primarily studied by those maritime states with global ambitions, who practiced 
it to coerce, reassure, and promote their own images. The bipolarity of the Cold 
War did little to change the purpose and tactics of naval diplomacy, but its use, 
for the most part, became ever more limited to the major seafaring states in the 
Western and Eastern blocs. Strategic thought in that period was anchored by 
superpower confrontation, but interest in naval diplomacy as a separate topic 
grew, particularly in the 1970s. The aftermath of the Cold War saw a transforma-
tion in world politics and a reassessment of the utility of force in general. Naval 
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diplomacy continued; indeed, its use expanded with the increase in the number 
of maritime stakeholders. If we look to the future we may start to see new aspects 
of an old role; ballistic-missile defense at sea, theater security cooperation, hu-
manitarian assistance and disaster relief, enforcement of no-fly zones, forward 
presence, and global fleet stations are all forms of postmodern naval diplomacy. 
As the strategies of the sea powers still testify, there is always advantage to be had 
from a “decided preponderance at sea.”
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